McDonnell Douglas DC-9 - Wikipedia
The ultimate guide to the many DC and MD variations. Author: David Hingtgen Submitted by: David Hingtgen Date: A key thing to look for to distinguish the engines on a DC, is where the end of the hot section is, in. DATES: This AD becomes effective August 8, . Boeing Alert Service Bulletins DCA and MDA describe Differences Between the AD and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC 28A The. On April 15, (69 FR , March 11, ), the Director of the Federal DCF, MDF, MDF, MD, and MDF airplanes. Request To Clarify Differences Between Service Bulletins . After the effective date of this AD, Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DCA, Revision 3.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Data and Service Management, Dept. The airplanes had accumulated 3, and 3, flight hours since installation of the electrical connector in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MDA The failures were attributed to arcing between the contacts in the potted backside of the electrical connector.
Subsequent x-ray inspections of the electrical connectors revealed soldering problems with the connector contacts. Continued arcing following a short circuit of the fuel pump housing electrical connector could damage the conduit that protects the power lead inside the fuel tank.
This condition, if not corrected, could create an ignition source inside the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. Therefore, all of these models may be subject to the same unsafe condition. That AD requires revising the airplane flight manual AFM to ensure that the flightcrew is advised of appropriate procedures for disabling certain fuel pump electrical circuits following failure of a fuel pump electrical connector.
For certain airplanes, that AD also requires revising the AFM to prohibit resetting of tripped fuel pump circuit breakers. Accomplishing the optional replacement of all electrical connectors in accordance with paragraph k or l of this AD, as applicable, terminates the requirements of AD Accomplishing the optional replacement of all electrical connectors in accordance with paragraph k of this AD terminates the requirements of AD Relevant Service Information We have reviewed the following service bulletins: The service bulletins also describe procedures for installing a placard on or adjacent to the flight engineer's fuel control panel or adjacent to display units 1 and 6, as applicable.
The IOPs advise the flightcrew of proper procedures for disabling certain fuel pump electrical circuits following failure of a fuel pump housing electrical connector. FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD The unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design.
For this reason, we are issuing this AD to prevent continued arcing following a short circuit of the fuel pump housing electrical connector, which could damage the conduit that protects the power lead inside the fuel tank; this condition could create an ignition source inside the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
If that electrical connector is installed, this AD requires the following additional actions: Revising the Procedures section of the FAA-approved AFM to advise the flightcrew of the appropriate procedures for disabling certain fuel pump electrical circuits following failure of a fuel pump housing electrical connector.
Deactivating certain fuel tanks or fuel pumps, as applicable. Installing placards on or adjacent to the flight engineer's fuel control panel or adjacent to display units 1 and 6, as applicable. This AD also allows the optional replacement of the fuel pump housing electrical connectors with new, improved parts, which would terminate the AFM revisions, deactivation of certain fuel tanks and fuel pumps, and placard installation.
This AD does not require any action for Group 5 airplanes. Also, this AD does not require accomplishing Work Package 2 for Groups 1, 2, and 3 airplanes and does not require accomplishing Work Package 5 for Group 4 airplanes; these work packages describe procedures for replacing the affected electrical connectors on tanks 1, 2, and 3. This AD does not require accomplishing Work Package 5 for Group 1 airplanes and does not require accomplishing Work Package 6 for Group 2 airplanes; these work packages describe procedures for replacing the affected electrical connectors on main tanks 1 and 3.
The compliance tables in paragraph 1. This AD, however, would require accomplishing those actions within 14 days after the effective date of this AD. We have coordinated this difference with Boeing. In this AD, we have referenced the headings for Work Package 3 exactly as they appear in the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. Interim Action We consider this AD interim action.
We are currently considering requiring replacement of all affected electrical connectors, which will constitute terminating action for the AFM revisions, deactivation of certain fuel tanks and fuel pumps, and placard installation required by this AD action.
However, the planned compliance time for the replacement of all affected connectors would allow enough time to provide notice and opportunity for prior public comment on the merits of the modification.
FAA's Determination of the Effective Date Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we have found that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable, and that good cause exists to make this AD effective in less than 30 days. Comments Invited This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment; however, we invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this AD.
We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the AD that might suggest a need to modify it. We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http: We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.
Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.
The aircraft hit the ground during downwind on the 2nd approach and caught fire. There was one fatality. On November 10—11,Southern Airways Flight 49 was hijacked while departing Birmingham, Alabama 's airport by three armed men.
This incident is notable for being the first hijacking in which an aircraft left Cuba with the hijackers on board. The DC-9 was destroyed, killing 10 and injuring 15 of the 45 people on board; two people among the 93 aboard the Convair suffered minor injuries. All 68 people on board the DC-9 were killed. One of the passengers initially survived the accident but later died in a hospital. On April 4,Southern Airways Flighta DC, lost engine power while flying through a severe thunderstorm before crash landing onto a highway in New Hope, Georgia, striking roadside buildings.
McDonnell Douglas DC-9
The crash and fire resulted in the death of both flight crew and 61 passengers. Nine people on the ground also died. Both flight attendants and 20 passengers survived. Two of the passengers and crew were killed.
McDonnell Douglas DC - Wikipedia
All 27 passengers and 4 crew members died in the crash and ensuing fire. Shown in the "Museo della Memoria" opened in Bologna in All 81 people on board were killed.
The cause has been the subject of a decades-long controversy, with either a terrorist bomb on board or an accidental shootdown during a military operation blamed for the accident. Bad weather and pilot error were blamed. During evacuation, the sudden influx of oxygen caused a flash fire throughout the cabin, resulting in the deaths of 23 of the 41 passengers, including Canadian folk singer Stan Rogers.
All five crew members survived. On December 7,the Madrid runway disaster took place where a departing Iberia Boeing struck an Aviaco Douglas DC-9 causing the death of 93 passengers and crew. All 42 passengers and crew on board the DC-9 were killed. The crash was caused by improper control inputs by the flight crew after the number 2 engine failed, and all 31 aboard were killed. This accident was attributed to a combination of confusion at the ATC, exceeding allowed time-limit for takeoff after de-icing the wings, and inexperienced crew.How This Plane Earned A Dangerous Reputation: The DC-10 Story
It entered the active runway instead of the taxiway instructed by air traffic controllers. It was then struck by a departing Boeing Nine people were killed.
There were 19 injuries, though all 77 aboard survived.